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THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT:
A BULGARIAN RESPONSE TO OBSOLESCENT LAW
DAVID A. LEVY*
*David A. Levy is a graduate of the School of Law at Southern Methodist
University, and is a member of the Pennsylvania Bar. He is the editor of the
GuLF WAR CLAIMS REPORTER (International Law Institute), and has written on
international leasing and Bulgarian commercial law development. Mr. Levy is
the Kronstein Visiting Research Fellow at the International Law Institute, and has
previously worked in the area of commercial and trade law harmonization with
the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law, U.S.
Department of State.
The author gives special thanks to Pavlin Nedelchev, Deputy Minister
'of the Bulgarian Ministry of Justice; Stanmir Alexandrov, Counselor of the
Embassy of Bulgaria in Washington, D.C.; Judge Virginia Haik of the Bourgas
District Court, and particularly Judge Doushana Zdravkova, President of the
Varna Regional Court; Col. Leo Zdravkova; Judge Rosen Alezsiev of the
Atropole District Court; Prof. Eddy Chakurov of the Varna Technical University;
Linda Foreman, Esq., of Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, CEELI Liaison and
Stephan Kyutchukov, Research Fellow and Program Secretary of the Center for
the Study of Democracy in Sofia, Bulgaria-along with the entire staff of the
Center for the Study of Democracy, without whose kind assistance this paper
would never have been possible.
It is essential to understand that while the Bulgarian Constitution of
1991 provides a social structure that represents a quantum leap from the
stagnation of the Communist era of Todor Zhivkov, many of the most
progressive and democratic ideals of that document have yet to be fully
implemented, due in part to the economic situation and the inability of the
legislature to pass needed legislation. As is true with any State in transition,
circumstances may change rapidly, therefore the article reflects information
understood to be accurate as of the time it was written. Any errors or omissions
are the sole responsibility of the author.
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I. INTRODUCTION
We live in an age of reactive lawmaking, a time where
statutory responses to societal ills create an increasingly complex
network of legislation lacking the evolutionary qualities associated
with classical common law theory. The question arises, how are
we, as a nation rooted in the common law tradition, going to deal
with positive law that grows obsolete, even counter-productive to
the laudable goals it possessed when newly passed? Guido
Calabresi, in his seminal work, A Common Law for the Age of
Statutes,' identifies the problem of outdated statutes which are
outside what he terms the "legal landscape",2 examines various
methods of legislative reconsideration of dated laws, and suggests
a judicial means by which courts may deal with statutes in much
the same way they treat common law.4
This paper considers proposals made by Dean Roscoe
1. GuIDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
Guido Calabresi, formerly Dean of the Yale Law School, was appointed by
President Clinton to the Second Circuit in 1994.
2. Id. at 21, n.18. "That a statute is out of phase neither entails nor requires that
the statute be old, in terms of the number of years since its enactment. Rather,
a statute is out of phase when it no longer fits with the legal landscape ...."
3. Id. at 16 (court's use of Alexander Bickel's "passive virtues" theory to prompt
legislative review); at 59-62 (legislative "sunsetting" or predetermined periods of
statutory validity); at 63 (use of joint legislative/executive review commissions);
at 63-64 (advisory law commissions as proposed by Judge Cardozo).
4. Id. at 82.
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Pound,5 Judge Henry Friendly,6 and Justices (then Judges)
Benjamin Cardozo,7 and Ruth Bader Ginsburg8 for a body which
would be authorized to consider problematic legislation and surveys
both state9 and federal law revision panels.10 It then examines
the experience of the Bulgarian Constitutional Court, a judicial
body created by the post-Communist Bulgarian Constitution" to
rule on the compatibility of domestic legislation and international
legal obligations with the Constitution.1 2  Finally, this paper
5. Roscoe Pound, Anachronisms in Law, 3 J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y 142 (1919).
6. Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators
Who Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 787 (1963).
7. Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113 (1921).
8. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Plea for Legislative Review, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 995
(1987).
9. See, eg., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 8289 (Deering 1992) California Law
Reform/Law Revision Commission authorized to:
(a) Examine the common law and statutes of the state and judicial decisions for
the purpose of discovering- defects and anachronisms in the law and
recommending needed reforms ... (c) Receive and consider suggestions from
judges, justices, public officials, lawyers, and the public generally as to defects
and anachronisms in the law. (d) Recommend, from time to time, such changes
in the law as it deems necessary to modify or eliminate antiquated and
inequitable rules of law, and to bring the law of this state into harmony with
modem conditions.
10. 2 U.S.C. § 285b (1993).
11. BULG. CONST. ch. 8, art. 147-52 (DV No. 56, July 13, 1991). Note: "DV" is
a citation abbreviation for "DURZHAVEN VESTNIK" (State Gazette). Under
Bulgarian law, positive law is required to be published in DURZHAVEN VESTNIK
within 15 days of its passage by the legislature. Il at ch. 3, art. 88(3).
12. Id. at art. 149(1-4).
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considers the viability of using such a body in the United States as
a means of contending with statutory anomalies existing outside
Calabresi's "legal landscape."
II. STATUTORY OBSOLESCENCE
A. The Problem Identified
Guido Calabresi identified a fundamental shift within the
framework of American law, a movement away from the
evolutionary, judge-made common-law toward a greater reliance on
statutory pronouncements. To Calabresi, the traditional common
law represented an organic process of principled decision-making
on the part of an educated judiciary. The changes in the law were
incremental, and developments in the law were the result of a
gradual series of decisions by individual judges driven by given
facts within a societal context.1 3 Statutes were so infrequent that
dated legislation remained on the books with very little detrimental
effect to the corpus of law.
14
As the Roosevelt administration crafted new and more
minutely detailed legislative initiatives as part of its New Deal,
America became increasingly attracted to statues. The specificity
of these statutes drafted in response to the unprecedented economic
pressure of the day was in marked contrast to the earlier, more
generalized examples of legislation, and New Deal era legislation
was ultimately accepted by later generations of lawmakers as the
legislative norm.'
5
The very detailed nature of these laws, which enabled them
to deal effectively with pressing social need, creates a problem of
13. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 4.
14. Id. at 4-5.
15. Id. at5.
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obsolescence.
When these laws were new and functional, so that they
represented in some sense the majority and its needs, the change
presented few fundamental problems. Soon, however, these laws,
like all laws, became middle-aged. They no longer served current
needs or represented current majorities. Changed circumstances,
or newer statutory and common law developments, rendered some
statutes inconsistent with a new social or legal topography.
16
As a realistic proposition, a legislature finds it much easier
to pass a law than to take steps to ensure its continuing validity,17
while rapid developments in our society serve to render reactive
legislation obsolete at a faster pace.' 8
Calabresi speaks of a broad "legal landscape" made up of
both case law and statutory pronouncements. 9  Laws are
consonant with this legal landscape when they are in conformity
with the underlying principles of its legal framework.20 This
internal consistency is one of the virtues of the gradual process of
16.Id. at6.
17. Id.; see also Friendly, supra note 6, at 792. "What I do lament is that the
legislator has diminished the role of the judge by occupying vast fields and has
failed to keep them ploughed .... [1]t matters very much if legislators, having
gone so far as to stunt the law-creating role of judges, fail to keep on creating
law themselves."
18. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 133.
19. Id. at 98. Elements of the legal landscape include common law decisions,
legislation, "scholarly criticisms" derived both from legal -and extra-legal sources
such as philosophy and economics, jury decisions, and administrative rulings. Id.
20. l at 6.
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common law.2' Statutes, on the other hand, because of their
quality of immediacy, may represent a conscious decision on the
part of the legislature to break with prior treatment of an issue.22
Such legislation is the product of the will of the people through
majoritarian support of a legislative initiative.23 It is therefore
possible to have a statutory pronouncement which represents an
abrupt shift in the law, lacking other statutes or decisions which are
based upon its rationales. 24 In time, the "gravitational pull" of the
statute will cause the legal landscape to conform to it,25 or the
statute may remain a legislative oddity, a law with seemingly little
effect on jurisprudence.26  To Calabresi, even the latter is
acceptable so long as the lone statute retains majoritarian
support.
27
21. Id. at 103. Indeed, to Calabresi, because the common law changes gradually
over time in response to changing societal forces, it may, at any given time, be
more reflective of majoritarian will than is a statute. Id.
22. Id. at 132. "[A] newborn statute may be the result of... overreaction to a
particular set of events, or a legislative response to a temporary majority at war
with more persistent societal views." Id.
23. Id. at 55. "When a legislature does act and its actions result in statutes, it is'
fair to assume that, at least for a time, the differences, preferences, and
inconsistencies it ordained are desired by the governed and are legitimate." Id.
24. Id. at 44. Calabresi suggests that much of the New Deal legislation was a
reaction to the economic crises of the day with little regard for the long-term
effect of these statutes. It was at this juncture that Calabresi feels that perhaps
the separation of powers doctrine was weakened due to political necessity and
the popularity of President Roosevelt. Id.
25. Id. at 107-108.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 6-9.
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It is where the statute no longer commands majoritarian
support, and is dissonant with the legal landscape-or was never a
part of the legal landscape-that Calabresi maintains the statute
inhibits the legal process.28 Such statutory anomalies, while
lacking majoritarian support, are seldom revised or discarded, either
through legislative inertia or the lingering political force of special
interest groups.29  These statutory relics, while perhaps just and
equitable when current, remain on the books, forcing courts to
resort to a variety of common law discretionary doctrines when
faced with hard cases.3 Calabresi is critical of such methods,
particularly the resort to constitutional adjudication as a means of
dealing with statutory obsolescence.3' Calabresi argues that:
[Jiudicial use of constitutional adjudication to
replace obsolete laws does not return us to the
traditional judicial-legislative balance. Once the
courts have modified or invalidated a statute on
constitutional grounds, they have done much more
than act in an area of legislative inertia. If the
court's aim is only to update in an area of inertia,
and if they are wrong in their judgment that a
statute which does not fit the legal fabric no longer
has majoritarian support, their use of constitutional
28. Id. at 9. Calabresi maintains that when a court is confronted with such a
"legislative anachronism" which is "dead, in both a majoritarian and consistency
sense, even though it retainfs] some sting" that it does a favor to itself, the
parties, and the legislature by striking down the statute.
29. Md at 6.
30. Id. at 16. Such judicial devices include doctrines such as delegation of
powers, void for vagueness, desuetude, and cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa
lex (the reason for the law ceasing, the law itself ceases).
31. Id. at 12-14.
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adjudication makes legislative correction of their
mistake impossible.32
To Calabresi, the repeated use of constitutional doctrines
such as equal protection weakens the adjudicative process resulting
in accusations of judicial activism and counter-majoritarianism.
33
Calabresi instead sees a need to prompt the legislature to
take a "second look" at statutes in order to assure their continued
viability.34 He rejects the use of purely administrative agencies,
that quintessential New Deal body of "scientific experts," as
becoming too closely identified with the legislation to be able to
objectively view the fit of the statute within the legal landscape,35
and he asserts that, as a practical matter, agency independence is
always suspect due to the political pressures of the Congressional
budget process.
36
"Sunsetting," or the mandatory reconsideration of a bill after
a fixed period of years, is a popular form of legislative review,
although Calabresi rejects it as an ultimate solution for statutory
obsolescence. To Calabresi, the age of a statute per se is not
indicative of the viability of a statute having continued majoritarian
32. Id. at 11.
33. Id. In fact, the use of the equal protection doctrine is often an exercise in
perspective. What is equality depends on the viewpoint of the observer. See
BERTRAND RUSSELL, AN OUTLINE OF PHILOSOPHY 157-66 (Meridian ed. 1963)
(1927) (discussing objectivity and subjectivity).
34. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 19. The purpose of the "second look" is "to
force majoritarian bodies like legislatures to face the issues and state openly
whether or not they intend to abridge what, over time, had become
near-constitutional guarantees." Id.
35. Id. at 46-53.
36. Id. at 53-54.
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support.37 Furthermore, in a context of widespread sunsetting
regulations, the legislature would be tempted to reapprove old laws
pro forma without true reconsideration.38
In addition, Calabresi dismisses the effectiveness of law
revision commissions such as those proposed by eminent jurists
like Cardozo as being overly restricted by their legislative mandate.
Calabresi argues:
This limited focus of the commissions in the past is
no accident and makes it unlikely that they could
perform differently now. They are not elected or
responsive to an elected body; neither can they
claim that their subservience to principle and
precedent gives them the legitimacy traditionally
accorded to judicial actions. For these reasons they
have been given no authority to do more than
recommend changes. And nothing can destroy the
force of such recommendations as to have them
systematically ignored.39
Calabresi sees little possibility that requisite authority would
be given to such a body and, absent the granting of both the power
and authority of a real court, there would be little incentive to
resort to such a commission!0
Calabresi views such legislative and executive review
commissions as performing essentially judicial functions when
making principled decisions regarding the fit of a given statute
37. Id. at 21, n.18.
38. Id. at 59-62.
39. Id. at 64.
40. Id. at 63-4.
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within the legal landscape.41 The assignment of new judicial
functions to bodies outside the normal judicial system is more in
keeping with European than American practice.42 Similarly,
Calabresi rejects the concept of a constitutional court as the body
most able to determine the continued viability of an aging law.43
He states that nomenclature notwithstanding, placing a continued
pressure on a non-judicial body to review laws causes it to behave
more and more like an actual court:
[I]n many countries, constitutional court judges are
appointed in ways very different from ordinary
judges, and the constitutional court is not part of the
ordinary trial or appeal court system. It remains a
judicial body nevertheless because its functions are
judicial . . . What is ironic about some of these
suggestions for noncourt reviewing bodies is that the
suggestions then try to make the body function more
like a court (i.e., more judicially) in order to
perform the reviewing function well. In short, this
sort of suggestion ends up seeking a body that is
fundamentally judicial in function, if not in
description.44
41. Id. at 63. Commissions which make principled reviews of statutes are
fulfilling an essentially judicial function.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 112, n.82.
44. Id. (internal citations omitted).
1995]
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B. The Calabresian Solution: "A Useful Step"
Calabresi's solution is to permit judges to treat statutes in
"precisely the same way that they treat the common law."45
They would be able to modify the application of a statute to suit
a given set of facts or to entirely abandon a statute when the
justification for it no longer exists.46 To Calabresi, judges are
ideally suited to this role, and
[t]he moment one accepts the legal fabric as an
acceptable starting point, because it reflects the
values of a people, it becomes easy to understand
why a legal system might give the power to make
conditional or temporary rules to people who by
training, selection, and relative independence are
reasonably adapted at discerning that framework and
its changes.47
Such judicial power would either permit the judges
themselves to make questionable legislation adhere to the legal
landscape, or by the actual or threatened exercise of judicial
authority induce legislatures to act in determining continued
majoritarian support and legislative viability.48  Calabresi
challenges us by asking: "[i]f there is a fabric of the law that
defines, justifies, and delimits judicial lawmaking, if statutes are a
part of this total fabric of the law, and if courts are to perform their
role of treating like cases alike, why should they fail to exercise
0
45. Id. at 82.
46. Id.




common law powers over statutes?" 49 Calabresi recognizes that
his identification of the problem of statutory obsolescence and a
proposed common law solution constitutes a "useful step" requiring
further development to become viable in practice.5
C. Criticisms of Calabresi's Theory
Scholars have criticized Calabresi's book as a "romantic
view of the common law judicial artist",5' which is "remarkably
casual in addressing some of the practical, as well as constitutional,
objections that his proposal inevitably raises. 5 2 Questions arise
of federalism, 53 separation of powers,54 and the ease with which
judges could "conjure up material for rationalizing blatantly
dishonest decisions under Calabresi's new doctrine."55 Moreover,
real world judges would be faced with a difficult task in
determining what constitutes Calabresi's "legal landscape.
5 6
49. Id. at 89.
50. Id. at 3.
51. Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New
Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 217 (1983).
52. Id. at 222.
53. Id. at 222, n.31.
54. Id. at 245. Calabresi's premise is based upon communication between the
judicial branch and legislatures or regulatory agencies. CALABRESI, supra note
1, at 166.
55. Id. at 253.
56. Id. at 225-27.
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MI. LAW REVIEW COMMISSION: AN AMERICAN APPROACH
Guido Calabresi was not unique in his recognition of the
need to periodically reevaluate laws in a contextual perspective.
Judges such as Benjamin Cardozo,57 Henry Friendly,58 and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, 59 along with noted legal scholars such as Roscoe
Pound6° have set forth proposals aimed at updating the laws.
The result has been the creation of state law revision
commissions6' which have operated with varying degrees of
success.
A. Roscoe Pound and "Anachronisms in the
Substantive Law"
Roscoe Pound, in a 1919 address to the American
Judicature Society, spoke of "anachronisms in the substantive law"
which were a result of common law adjudication.62  He
recognized a need for the creation of a "ministry of justice" to
survey the law in order to identify areas needing improvement.
Pound specifically asserted that
[w]e need a body of men competent to study the
law and its actual administration functionally, to
ascertain the legal needs of the community and the
57. See Cardozo, supra note 7.
58. See Friendly, supra note 6.
59. See Ginsberg, supra note 8.
60. See Pound, supra note 5.
61. See, e.g., N.Y. LEGIS. LAW §§ 70-72 (Consol. 1993).
62. Pound, supra note 5, at 146.
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defects in the administration of justice not
academically or a priori, but in the light of
everyday judicial experience and to work out
definite, consistent, lawyer-like programs of
improvement.63
Pound's Ministry of Justice conception was in many ways
the spiritual precursor of Calabresi's "judicial artist" surveying the
"legal landscape" for statutory obsolescence. 64 Pound further
argued for an advocate to fill the role of Minister of Justice, and
that
[i]t would be his responsibility to see to it that the
law in general and, as a whole, not in particular
cases, was a means of furthering justice, to prepare
legislation on the basis of critical, scientific study,
to watch the law and the operation of legal and
judicial machinery, locating leaks and diagnosing
defects, and to find the means to stop and remedy
them.
65
It would, however, take the influence of Judge Cardozo and the
creation of the New York Law Revision Commission for Pound's
vision to become reality.
63. Id.
64. CALABRESI, supra note 19.
65. Pound, supra note 5, at 147.
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B. Benjamin Cardozo: A Ministry of Justice
Judge Cardozo, acknowledging the work of Roscoe
Pound,5 spoke of the problems associated with antiquated
laws67 and called for the creation of an impartial body charged
with "view[ing] the field [of law] in its entirety '68 in the
determination of the continued vitality of a given rule of law.
Recognizing the concept's European antecedents,69 Cardozo saw
the body fulfilling a primarily advisory role, namely, that of
informing both the public and the legislature of the need to change
an outdated or inconsistent law. This communication leaves the
final decision on the law up to a majoritarian legislature.70
Cardozo observed that courts and legislatures traditionally
operate "in proud and silent isolation" from one another.71 The
legislature, not aware of the practical problems of their laws on the
courts "patches the fabric here and there, and mars often what it
would mend. 7 2 To Cardozo, the solution would be the creation
66. Judge Cardozo wrote that the concept of a ministry of justice "has been
developed by Dean Pound with fertility and power." Cardozo, supra note 7, at
114.
67. Id. at 118. Cardozo cited to Pinnel's case, 5 Coke 117 and Dumpor's case,
2 Coke 119 as examples of common law which "maintain a ghostly and
disquieting existence in the ancient byways of the law." Id. at 118, n.13, 14, and
accompanying text.
68. Id. at 119.
69. Id. at 114. "In countries of continental Europe, the project has passed into the
realm of settled practice." Id.
70. Id. at 125.
71. Id. at 114.
72. Id. at 113-114.
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of a specialized commission, a "ministry of justice" authorized to
view the field in its entirety, and not, as judges view
it, in isolated sections, who will watch the rule
working in its working, and not, as judges watch it,
in its making, and who viewing and watching and
classifying and comparing, will be ready, under the
responsibility of office, with warning and
suggestion.73
Cardozo proposed an inter-disciplinary, 74  formalized
agency which evaluates current law drawing from diverse sources
including scholarly legal treatises, social science journals and
foreign law, inter alia.7' Ultimately, Cardozo concluded that in
order for a ministry of justice to prove effective, its mandate must
be specific, and its goal defined in terms of bridging the
communications gap between the courts and legislatures:
Doubtless, there will be a need to guard against the
twin dangers of overzeal on the one hand and of
inertia on the other - of the attempt to do too much
and of the willingness to do too little. In the end,
of course, the recommendations of the ministry will
be recommendations and nothing more. The public
will be informed of them. The bar and others
73. Id. at 119.
74. Id. at 124. "There should be representatives, not less than two, perhaps even
as many as three, of the faculties of law or political science in institutes of
learning. Hardly elsewhere shall we find the scholarship on which the ministry
must be able to draw if its work is to stand the test. There should be, if
possible, a representative of the bench; and there should be a representative or
representatives of the bar."
75. Id.
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interested will debate them. The legislature may
reject them. But at least the lines of communication
will be open.76
Drawing on Judge Cardozo's concepts, in 1934, the state of
New York created the Law Revision Commission' "for the
purpose of discovering defects and anachronisms in the law and
recommending needed reforms. '78  Early successes included
reforms of the laws governing contributory negligence and criminal
extradition.79  The Law Revision Commission was later
instrumental in prompting revisions of the 1951 text of the Uniform
Commercial Code. 80 At present, thirteen states and the District of
Columbia have some form of law revision commission.8
76. Id. at 125.
77. Bernard L. Shientag, A Ministry of Justice in Action: The Work of the New
York State Law Revision Commission, 22 CORNELL L. Q. 183, 184 (1937).
78. N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 72 (Consol. 1993).
79. Shientag, supra note 77, at 186.
80. JAMES J. WHITE and ROBERT S. SUMMERS, Introduction to the Second
Edition of HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 4, at 11 (2d ed. 1980).
81. Jurisdictions having some form of law review commission include Alabama,
ALA. CODE § 29-8-1 (1993); California, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8289 (Deering
1993); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2-85 (1992); the District of Columbia,
D.C. CODE ANN. § 49-402 (1992); Florida, FLA. STAT. Ch. 13.90 (1992);
Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24:201 (West 1992); Michigan, MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 4.1401 (1992); New Jersey, N.J. REV. STAT. § 1:12A-1 (1992); New
York, N.Y. LEGIS. LAW §70 (Consol. 1993); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 173.315
(1991); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 22-11-3.4 (1992); Tennessee, TENN.
CODE ANN. § 3-12-101 (1993); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 1.08.025
(1991); and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. § 13.93 (1991-92).
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C. Henry J. Friendly: The Prevalence of Statutes
Judge Henry J. Friendly, writing over forty years after
Cardozo,82 recognized that the problems facing judges had shifted
from obsolete common law to a surfeit of statutes.8 3 To Friendly,
a legislature, with its ability to find facts independent from those
of individual litigants, to not feel bound by strict stare decisis, and
to be responsive to the popular will, possesses distinct advantages
over traditional common law development.8 4 Nevertheless, the
increased reliance on statutory law limits the ability of judges to
deal with defective statutes.8 5
Friendly identified two defects in statutes: 1) those statutes
that "literally [say] something that [the legislature] probably did not
mean, '86 and 2) the more common problem of "rather detailed
statutes-that are ambiguous and are left so for decades."87 Efforts
by courts to correct the problem results in the criticism that of
courts rewrite statutes the public should be able to rely on.
Friendly observed that "rectification of error does not appear to
82. See Friendly, supra note 6.
83. Id. at 789-90. "Vast areas once the province of judges have been enclosed
by the legislature." Id. at 790.
84. Id. at 791-92.
85. Id. at 792. "[Friendly's] criticism is directed .. .at cases in which the
legislature has said enough to deprive the judges of power to make law even in
such subordinate respects but has given them guidance that is defective in one
way or another, and then does nothing by way of remedy when the problem
comes to light." Id.
86. Id. at 792.
87. Id. at 793.
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enjoy a high priority on legislative calendars."' 8
Citing to the successes of the New York Law Revision
Commission,89 Friendly posited a federal law revision committee
attached to the legislature. 9° Unlike Cardozo's inter-disciplinary
model, Friendly's proposal relied on legal professionals, the chair
and ranking minority member of the Judiciary Committees of the
House and Senate, a federal judge as chairman, and others "drawn
from the ranks of legal scholars, retired judges, and lawyers who
have attained the age where such public service is more attractive
than continued professional success."9 1
Friendly's proposed committee would be designed to study
laws and recommend changes to the appropriate legislative
committee, which "ought to welcome an agency that would aid
them in the politically unrewarding task... of the 'petty tinkering
of the legal system which is necessary to keep it in running
order."' 92  This federal law revision committee "would have a
passion, if not for anonymity, at least for the background, 93 and
would maintain a retentionist bias toward borderline statutes.
94
Despite Judge Friendly's scholarly influence, a House Office of the
88. Id. at 799.
89. Shientag, supra note 77.
90. Friendly, supra note 6, at 804. "It would seem elementary that an agency
whose task is to formulate legislation and secure its enactment should be attached
to the legislature .... The legislature thus does not regard the commission as
an alien usurper." Id.
91. Id. at 805.
92. Id. at 805-06 (quoting Pound, supra note 5, at 145).
93. Id. at 806.
94. Id. "[I]ts watchwords should be deliberation rather than speed, discretion
rather than valor . ..."
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Law Revision Counsel, with a more modest mandate, was not
created until 1974.95
D. Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Judicial "Plea" for a Second
Look
Justice Ginsburg, then a member of the D.C. Circuit,
recognized that statutory ambiguity created problems of increased
litigation, intercircuit disagreement, and charges of judicial activism
as judges struggled to fathom the meaning of an obscure law.96
Ginsburg called on Congress to "install a system of legislative
review and revision under which [it] would take a second look at
a law once a court opinion or two highlighted the measure's
infirmities."97 In this model, the courts remain the bodies which
identify problematic statutes and prompt the legislature for the law
revision needed to curb or to cohesively resolve litigation.98
Rather than wait for the "grand designs" of Cardozo and
Pound, and the creation of the "Ministry of Justice,"99 Ginsburg
proposed expanding the role of an already existing legislative
review body already in existence, the House Office of the Law
Revision Counsel.1°° The Office was conceived as an impartial
body whose principle purpose is to "develop and keep current an
95. 2 U.S.C. § 285 (enacted Dec. 27, 1974, effective Jan. 2, 1975).
96. Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 996.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1001.
99. Id. at 1012.
100. Id. at 1015; see also 2 U.S.C. § 285 (1975).
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official and positive codification of the laws of the United
States.' 0 1 It is also designed to review all public laws passed by
Congress and "submit to the [House] Committee on the Judiciary
recommendations for the repeal of obsolete, superfluous, and
superseded provisions . ... ,, Furthermore, the Office is
authorized to, one title at a time, propose amendments and
corrections to the U.S. Code, and to "remove ambiguities,
contradictions, and other imperfections both of substance and of
form."'
103
The present activity of the Office of Law Revision Counsel
is much less sweeping than that proposed by Justice Ginsburg.
According to Fred Willett, Law Revision Counsel to the House of
Representatives,104 the Office functions in more of a caretaking
role in relation to the Code. Currently involved in a long-term
recodification project, the Office examines all laws within a title in
an attempt to identify obsolete, superseded or irrelevant
date-specific provisions. When it finds such "deadwood,"
typographical errors, or other technical flaws, it compiles the
corrections in a "repealer table" in the back of that Code title. 05
For the Law Revision Counsel to operate as proposed by Justice
Ginsburg, namely, as an arbiter of statutory interpretation, it will
need a much more explicit legislative mandate.
101. 2 U.S.C. § 285a (1975).
102. 2 U.S.C. § 285b(2) (1975).
103. 2 U.S.C. § 285b(1) (1975).
104. Telephone interview with Fred Willett, Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House
of Representatives (Mar. 10, 1994).




IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT: A BULGARIAN APPROACH
The Balkan nation of Bulgaria has historically been marked
by long periods of political and social stability contrasted with
abrupt societal shifts. These contrasts are strikingly reflected in the
adaptations made by the Bulgarian legal system. Today, the
Constitutional Court is the body authorized by the Bulgarian
constitution" to deal with laws rendered obsolete by political
change.
A. Historical Antecedents/Sources of Law
The birth of the Bulgarian state was the consequence of a
political merger of ancient southern Slavs with invading tribes in
the 7th century.10 7  The formation of the new state was
documented by the Treaty of 681 between the first Bulgarian Khan
(King) Isperikh and the Byzantine Emperor Constantin
Pogonat.'0 8  Sources of law from the establishment of the
Bulgarian state until the conquest by the Ottoman Turks in 1393
included local customary law,"° legislative decrees of ruling
Kings, and certain Byzantine and other foreign laws translated into
Ancient Bulgarian. 110
106. BuLG. CONST. ch. 8, art. 147-52 (DV No. 56, July 13, 1991).
107. Ivan Sipkov, The Legal System of Bulgaria in 8 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS
CYCLOPEDIA 38, 45 (Kenneth Redden ed., 1985).
108. Id.
109. This customary law was not codified or translated into written law until the
early 20th century when Stefan S. Bobchev published his COLLECTION OF
BULGARIAN LEGAL CUSTOMS (1896-1908). Ivan Sipkov, LEGAL SOURCES AND
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF BULGARIA 1, 2 (1956) [hereinafter Sipkov II].
110. Id. at 1.
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Bulgaria was conquered by the Ottoman Turks in 1393 and
became subject to imperial Turkish law."' This Imperial law
combined Moslem religious law as well as religious law from
non-Islamic communities, Greek law from Byzantine sources,
Bulgarian customary law, and adaptations of then-current European
laws.
' 2
Turkish rule over Bulgaria was ended by the Russo-Turkish
war of 1877-78."' The Treaty of Berlin, which followed on July
13, 1878, created two regions, a Bulgarian Principality and Eastern
Rumelia. The two regions merged in 1885 and, in 1908, declared
itself an independent kingdom." 4  As part of the Treaty of
Berlin, a Constitutional Assembly was convened at Timovo, the
medieval capital of Bulgaria, and adopted the "Tirnovo"
constitution on April 16, 1879."' The Tirnovo constitution was
based on liberal European models of a constitutional monarchy and
a parliamentary democracy."16  During the transition period
following the adoption of the Tirnovo constitution, Bulgarian courts
continued to apply basic Ottoman substantive and procedural laws
until the new Bulgarian codes were promulgated." 7  For
example, the Ottoman Commercial Code"' survived until 1898
111. let
112. Id. at 3.
113. Id. at4.
114. Id.
115. Idl at 5.
116. Id.
117. L




when the Bulgarian Commercial Code, 119 compiled from German,
Romanian, and Hungarian sources, was adopted.
120
The Kingdom of Bulgaria sided with the Axis powers
during World War II, surrendered to the Allies on September 9,
1944, and was subsequently occupied by the Soviet Army.
121
The Fatherland Front, a coalition which included the Communist
party, gained political control. 2 2  A referendum to abolish the
monarchy was held September 8, 1946, and the People's Republic
of Bulgaria, dominated by the Communist party, was proclaimed
shortly thereafter. 123 A Grand National Assembly was convened
which included elected representatives of opposition parties. 124
Communists repudiated the mandates of the opposition deputies,
outlawed the primary opposition party,' 5 and assumed control of
the Grand National Assembly. The Grand National Assembly
proceeded to adopt a new constitution of the People's Republic of
Bulgaria, 126 the "Dimitriov constitution" based on the Soviet
constitution of 1936.127
119. BuLG. COM. CODE (DV No. 114, May 29, 1897).
120. Sipkov II, supra note 109, at 4-5.
121. Id at 8.
122. Sipkov, supra note 107, at 44.
123. Id
124. Sipkov II, supra note 109, at 8.
125. DV No. 119, (Aug. 28, 1947).
126. CONSTIrUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA, (DV No. 284,
Dec. 6, 1947).
127. Sipkov II, supra note 109, at 8-9.
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B. Ideological Statutory Obsolescence
1. The Communist Era
The Communist upheaval brought with it the imposition of
a political and social philosophy not rooted in Bulgarian tradition,
thus placing very different types of demands on the Bulgarian legal
system. 2 ' Nevertheless, legal necessity required a pragmatic
approach. During the transition to Communist rule, old Bulgarian
laws remained in effect. 29 Laws which were not in conflict with
the political theory of the Dimitriov constitution were retained,
while those in opposition were repealed or amended by the
Presidium of the National Assembly subject to the approval of the
legislature. Ultimately, the National Assembly passed a general
repudiation of laws rendered politically obsolete: 30 "All laws
and legislative acts enacted prior to September 9, 1944, are hereby
repealed and made ineffective as being contrary to the Dimitriov
Constitution [of 1947] and the socialist legislation introduced in
Bulgaria after September 9, 1944.
''13l
As a practical matter, there was a great deal of continuity
in the law between Bulgarian laws enacted pursuant to the Tirnovo
constitution's model of a constitutional monarchy and the Dimitriov
constitution's concept of a socialist People's Republic. Under the
Communist regime of Todor Zhivkov, the government did not
engage in wholesale invalidation of pre-1947 statutory laws.
3 2
128. Interview with Rosen Alexsiev, District Judge of Atropole, in Sofia, Bulg.
(July 23, 1993).
129. Sipkov, supra note 107, at 45.
130. DV No. 41, (Nov. 20, 1951).
131. d.; see Sipkov II, supra note 109, at 8-9.
132. Sipkov II, supra -note 109, at 45.
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The process was evolutionary with specific provisions, such as
property laws, modified, while the bulk of the codes remained
unchanged. Given the fluidity of law as a societal tool, some
degree of change in the legal landscape would have been inevitable
during the forty-two years of Communist rule in Bulgaria.'33 The
Dimitriov constitution was itself replaced in 1971 by the more
modem constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.' 34
2. Post-Communist Democracy
Communist rule in Bulgaria ended when Todor Zhivkov
was deposed in late 1989.135 The emerging democracy grappled
with the challenge of true majoritarian rule. In June 1990, the
former Communist party, reorganized as the Bulgarian Socialist
Party, (BSP) won a narrow majority of the seats in the National
Assembly over the primary opposition party, the Union of
Democratic Forces (UDF)136  The BSP was unable to govern
despite having a parliamentary majority; political deadlock was
133. Interview with Stanmir Alexandrov, Counselor, Embassy of Bulgaria, in
Washington, D.C. (Mar. 17, 1993).
134. CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA, (DV No. 39, May
16, 1971).
135. Former Communist leader Todor Zhivkov was convicted in 1992 for abuse
of power involving personal expense accounts and state privileges. JOINT STAFFS
OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND HOUSE COMM. IN FOREIGN
AFF., 103D CONG., 2D SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
FOR 1993 818 (Comm. Print 1994) [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS]. The
Bulgarian Supreme Court later rejected Zhivkov's appeal of the seven-year jail
sentence. Phillippa Fletcher, Bulgaria Convicts Dictator Zhivkov for
Embezzlement, Reuters New Service - CIS and Eastern Europe, Jan. 18, 1994,
available in LEXIS, World News Library, TXTEE file.
136. Robert Dahl, Bulgaria's Political Evolution, BULG. LEGAL DEv., Feb. 1992,
at 1.
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avoided by the appointment of an interim cabinet headed by
Dimitar Popov, a politically unaffiliated jurist.
37
On July 12, 1991, the new constitution of the Republic of
Bulgaria 138 was signed by 309 of the Grand National Assembly's
400 members. 39 In October 1991, Assembly elections were held
again. The UDF, with the support of the predominantly ethnic
Turkish Movement of Rights and Freedoms (MRF), won by a close
majority and was able to form a new government. 40 Eleven
months later, after losing a no-confidence vote in Parliament, this
government fell and was replaced by a non-party coalition
government headed by the centrist economist Lyuben Berov.1
4
1
In January, 1992, the Bulgarian people had their first ever direct
election of a President, and re-elected incumbent Zhelyu Zhelev, a
UDF member and strong supporter of democratic reforms who, in'
1990, was appointed President by the National Assembly.'
42
After a two year tenure and the survival of a series of no-
137. Stephan Kyutchukov, Law on Economic Activity of Foreign Persons and on
Protection of Foreign Investment, 3 ISSUES IN BULG. L. 2 (1992).
138. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA, (DV No. 56, July 13,
1991).
139. Kyutchukov, supra note 137, at 2.
140. Id. It is significant to note that while the Article 11(4) of the new Bulgarian
constitution prohibits the formation of political parties "on ethnic, racial or
religious lines," the Bulgarian Supreme Court, in a landmark decision, concluded
that the Movement for Rights and Freedoms should have the same rights to
political expression as other parties. The Constitutional Court later affirmed this
decision. David A. Levy, Bulgarian Supreme Court Justice Speaks at Tillar
House, ASIL NEWSLETTER, Mar.-May, 1995, at 17.
141. Anthony Robinson, Light at the End of the Tunnel, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 13,
1994, at 11.
142. Dahl, supra note 136, at-I.
[Vol. 4
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
confidence votes, Berov's non-party "cabinet of experts" resigned
on September 2, 1994, citing the political stalemate in Parliament
as a primary reason for their departure.143  President Zhelev
dissolved Parliament, appointed a caretaker government headed by
Reneta Indzhova, the former head of the privatization agency, and
set December 18, 1994, as the date for Bulgaria's third general
election since the ouster of Todor Zhivkov in 1989.44 The
Bulgarian Socialist Party won a clear majority in the national
elections 45 and BSP leader Zhan Videnov was named as
Bulgaria's new Prime Minister.1
46
3. Constitutional Structure
The Constitution defines the Republic of Bulgaria as a
parliamentary democracy 47  consisting of separation of
143. Premier Berov Asks National Assembly to Accept Resignation (BBC
Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts, Sept. 9, 1994), available in LEXIS,
World News Library, TXTEE file. See also Berov Says Government Is Resigning
So That Parliament Can Decide (BBC Monitoring Summary of World
Broadcasts, Sept. 5, 1994), available in LEXIS, World News Library, TXTEE
file.
144. Bulgaria: General Elections-President Dissolves Parliament and Calls
Elections (BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts, Oct. 19, 1994),
available in LEXIS, World News Library, TXTEE file.
145. Bulgarian Socialists Win, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1994, at A35.
146. Bulgaria: President Proposes BSP Leader Videnov as Prime Minister (BBC
Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts, Jan. 26, 1995), available in LEXIS,
World News Library, TXTEE file.
147. BuLG. CONST. ch. 1, art. 1(1).
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powers, 4 ' popular sovereignty,'49 and direct elections. 50 In
addition, it contains a supremacy clause'5 and incorporates
international law as part of domestic law. 5 2  The Constitution
also provides for individual liberties, including property rights,'53
the right to privacy, 154  freedoms of religion 55  and the
press,5 6 and the rights to legal defense5 7 and affordable health
148. Id. at ch. 1, art 8. "The power of the state shall be divided between a
legislative, an executive and a judicial branch." Id.
149. Id. at ch. 1, art. 1(3). "No part of the people, no political party nor any
other organization, state institution or individual shall usurp the expression of the
popular sovereignty." Id.
150. Id. at ch. 1, art. 10. "All elections, and national and local referendums shall
be held on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot." Id.
151. Id. at ch. 1, art. 5(1). "The Constitution shall be the supreme law, and no
other law shall contravene it." Id.
152. Id. at ch. 1, art. 5(4). "Any international instruments which have been
ratified by the constitutionally established procedure, promulgated and come into
force with respect to the Republic of Bulgaria, shall be considered part of the
domestic legislation of the country. They shall supersede any domestic legislation
stipulating otherwise." Id.
153. Id. at ch. 1, art. 17 (1-3). "The right to property and inheritance shall be
guaranteed and protected by law. Property shall be private and public. Private
property shall be inviolable." Id
154. Id. at ch. 2, art. 32(1). "The privacy of citizens shall be inviolable." Id.
155. Id. at ch. 1, art. 13(1,2). "The practicing of any religion shall be free. The
religious institutions shall be separate from the state." ld.
156. Md. at ch. 2, art. 40(1). "The press and the other mass information media
shall be free and shall not be subjected to censorship." Id.





Furthermore, the Bulgarian Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary 159 with an independent budget' 60 aimed
at protecting the interests of the people.16 ' The judicial branch
is consists of courts of first instance and courts of appeal. 162
The theory of Bulgarian civil law is that there is an objective,
158. Id. at ch. 2, art. 52(1). "Citizens shall have the right to medical insurance
guaranteeing them affordable medical care, and to free medical care in
accordance with conditions and procedures established by a law." Id.
159. Ic at ch. 6, art. 117(2). "The judicial branch shall be independent. In the
performance of their functions, all judges, court assessors [damages experts],
prosecutors and investigating magistrates shall be subservient only to the law."
Id.
160. 1& at ch. 6, art. 117(3).
161. I& at ch. 6, art. 117(1). "The judicial branch of government shall safeguard
the rights and legitimate interests of all citizens, legal entities and the state." Id.
162. Id. at ch. 6, art. 119(1). "Justice shall be administered by the Supreme Court
of Cassation, the Supreme Administrative Court, courts of appeals, courts of
assizes, courts-martial and district courts." Id.
a. "The Supreme Court of Cassation shall exercise supreme judicial oversight as
to the precise and equal application of the law by all courts." Id. at ch. 6, art.
124.
b. "The Supreme Administrative Court shall exercise supreme judicial oversight
as to the precise and equal application of the law in administrative justice. The
Supreme Administrative Court shall rule on all challenges to the legality of acts
of the Council of Ministers and the individual ministers, and of other acts
established by a law." Id at ch. 6, art. 125 (1,2).
As of this writing, however, the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme
Judicial Court have yet to be formed, and the Supreme Court remains the single
high court. Levy, supra note 140.
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discernible truth, 63 and it is the duty of the courts to ascertain
the truth at issue. 64
C. The Constitutional Court
The Bulgarian Constitutional Court is not a court in the
common law sense.' 65 Based on the German concept of judicial
review of law exercised through a powerful constitutional
court,166 Bulgaria established the Constitutional Court as the final
arbiter of the constitutionality of laws or governmental actions.
Individual citizens have no standing before the Constitutional
Court, and its decisions are mandatory and binding.
The Constitutional Court is comprised of twelve justices
representing the tripartite branches of the government: four justices
are elected by the National Assembly; four justices are appointed
by the President; and four justices are elected by a joint meeting of
the justices of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme
Administrative Court.167 The justices serve for a single nine-year
term and appointments are staggered on a three-year cycle,
168
thus limiting institutional inertia. Constitutional Court justices are
"lawyers of high professional and moral integrity ... with at least
163. Interview with Virginia Haik, District Judge of Bourgas, in Dallas, Tex.
(Mar. 11, 1993).
164. BULG. CONST. ch. 6, art. 121(2). "Judicial proceedings shall ensure the
establishment of truth." Id.
165. Levy, supra note 140.
166. Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz (BVerfGG) (Statute of the Federal
Constitutional Court).
167. BuLG. CONST. ch. 8, art. 147(1).
168. Id. ch. 8, art. 147(2).
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fifteen years of professional experience. '16 9  To help ensure
judicial independence, justices of the Constitutional Court are
prohibited from concurrently holding any elected office or other
official post, belonging to a trade union or political party, or
practicing any occupation.
170
The Constitutional Court was created with a broad mandate
under the Bulgarian constitution which provides that:
Art. 149. (1) The Constitutional Court shall:
1. Provide binding interpretations of the
Constitution;
2. Rule on challenges to the constitutionality of the
laws and other acts passed by the National
Assembly and the acts of the President;
3. Rule on competence suits between the National
Assembly, the President and the Council of
Ministers, and between the bodies of local
self-government and the central executive branch of
government;
4. Rule on the compatibility between the
Constitution and the international instruments
concluded by the Republic of Bulgaria prior to their
ratification, and on the compatibility of domestic
laws with the universally recognized norms of
international law and the international instruments to
which Bulgaria is a party;
171
169. ML ch. 8, art. 147(3).
170. Id. ch. 8, art. 147(5).
171. It is significant to note that the Communist constitution of 1971 made no
provision for the application of international treaty law as part of Bulgarian
domestic law. Ivan Sipkov, The Public International Law of Bulgaria:
Development and Status, 10 INT. J. LEG. INFO. 326, 341-42 (1982). Paragraph
four's reference to "universally recognized norms of international law" seemingly
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5. Rule on challenges to the constitutionality of
political parties and associations;
6. Rule on challenges to the legality of an election
of the President and Vice President;
7. Rule on challenges to the legality of an election
of a Member of the National Assembly;
8. Rule on impeachments by the National Assembly
against the President or the Vice President.
(2) No authority of the Constitutional Court shall be
vested or suspended by a law.
172
The Constitutional Court decides issues referred by the
National Assembly, the President, the Council of Ministers, the
Supreme Court of Cassation, the Supreme Administrative Court, or
the Chief Prosecutor. 7 3  Individual litigants are not deemed
competent to make direct references before the Court. If the
Supreme Court of Cassation or the Supreme Administrative Court
finds a discrepancy between a law and the Constitution, it suspends
the proceedings and refers the matter to the Constitutional
Court.74 The Constitutional Court takes an average of four
weeks to render its decisions," and relief is prospective.7 6
expands the role of international law to include customary international law as
part of domestic law. Compare The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)
("International law is part of our law . . . [and] where there is no treaty ...
resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations. ..
172. BULG. CONST. ch. 8, art. 149.
173. Id. ch. 8, art. 150(1).
174. Id ch. 8, art. 150(2).
175. Interview with Stephan Kyutchukov, Research Fellow and Program




The court's decisions lack executive power, and it is up to
Parliament to alter or repeal the suspended law in order to
eliminate any discrepancy or conflict with the Constitution.177
The concept of a Constitutional Court represents a departure
from previous Bulgarian models of constitutional protections.
178
The Communist-era Constitution of 1971 gave the power of
constitutional review to the National Assembly. "The National
Assembly sees to it that the laws do not run counter to this
constitution. It alone decides whether a law runs counter to the
constitution and whether the condition for its issue required by the
constitution have been observed."'179 It has been suggested that
the rationale behind legislative review has been a traditional
distrust of the independence of an ideological judiciary closely
aligned with either a political party or the executive branch.80
D. Transitions: Legal and Political Statutory Obsolescence
With the fall of Communism in 1989, Bulgaria again found
176. BuLG. CONST. ch. 8, art. 151(2). "Rulings of the Constitutional Court shall
be promulgated in Durzhaven Vestnik within 15 days from the date on which
they are issued. A ruling shall come into force three days after its promulgation.
Any act found to be unconstitutional shall cease to apply as of the date on which
the ruling shall come into force."
177. Levy, supra note 140.
178. Id. Dr. Bobatinov, a Bulgarian Supreme Court Justice, observed that
Bulgarians are not yet accustomed to reliance on the court system for protection
of their Constitutional rights and that Bulgarian attorneys are having to adjust to
new adversary skills when representing their clients in claims
against the government. Id.
179. BULG. CONST. ch. IV, art. 85(1, 2) (DV No. 39, May 18, 1971).
180. Jon Elster, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction, 58 U.
CHI. L. REv. 447, 465-66 (1991).
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itself faced with a body of laws containing statutes rendered
obsolete or irrelevant by changing political circumstances. The
"Transitional and Concluding Provisions" of the constitution
directly establish the means by which Bulgaria will cope with the
problem of statutory obsolescence caused by abrupt shifts in the
legal landscape. The methods chosen, except for the use of the
Constitutional Court, are consistent with the pragmatic approach
Bulgaria took when it was confronted with the task of making the
transition from democratic to Communist law in the wake of World
War I.181
Previous law remains in force until it is amended or
replaced. Final decisions about the applicability of these laws
remain the province of the Constitutional Court.182 Perhaps the
framers of the Bulgarian constitution were "overly optimistic"'
183
in their belief that the Constitutional Court would be able to make
all necessary determinations within a year to allow a general
rescission by the National Assembly' 84 and that a multiparty
legislature could act quickly enough to pass all "laws expressly
required by th[e] constitution ... within three years." '185 In fact,
the Judicial System Act 86 providing the necessary organizational
and procedural structures for the courts was only recently passed
181. For discussion of post-World War 1i legal transition, see Sipkov, supra, note
107.
182. BULG. CONST., Transitional & Concluding Provisions cl. 3(1)(DV No. 56,
July 13, 1991). "The provisions of the existing laws shall be applicable insofar
as they do not contravene the Constitution."
183. Interview with Stanmir Alexandrov, Counselor, Embassy of Bulgaria, in
Washington, D.C. (March 17, 1993).
184. BULG. CONST., Trans'l & Concl. Prov. cl. 3(2).
185. BULG. CONST., Trans'l & Concl. Prov. cl. 3(3).
186. Judicial System Act (DV No. 59, July 22, 1994).
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by Parliament in July 1994, and amid political controversy.187
V. AN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT?
Would an American Constitutional Court, based on the
Bulgarian civil law model, be a viable solution to the problem of
statutory obsolescence? A Constitutional Court would potentially
be an ideal arbiter of the legal landscape. Indeed, Calabresi points
to the decisions of the German Constitutional Court as examples of
communications to a legislature that statutes formerly possessing
majoritarian support are "moving 'toward unconstitutionality."it
8 8
What would be the Constitutional support for the creation
187. The Judicial System Act, as passed by Parliament, contained several
controversial provisions which included a requirement that membership in the
Supreme Judicial Council be restricted to judges, prosecutors, investigators, or
academics with five years experience in these posts. Supreme Judicial Act, art.
16(1). These posts were formerly reserved for members of the Communist Party
and effectively limited membership on the Council to ex-Communists, prompting
President Zhelev to veto the Act. Phillipa Fletcher, Bulgarian Court
'DeComunises" [sic] New Judicial Law, Reuters News Service - CIS and Eastern
Europe, Sept. 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, World News Library, TXTEE File.
Parliament overrode President Zhelev's veto and reenacted the law. Parliament
Passes Judiciary Act Unchanged (BBC Monitoring Service: Eastern Europe, July
19, 1994), available in LEXIS, World News Library, TXTEE File. The tenure
provision of the law was criticized as a political attempt to remove Chief Justice
Ivan Grigorov and Chief Prosecutor Ivan Tartarchev, a strong anti-Communist,
who were private attorneys before their appointment. Radio Commentary Views
Fragility of Democracy After Judiciary Bill Challenge Fails (BBC Monitoring
Service: Eastern Europe, Aug. 16, 1994), available in LEXIS, World News
Library, TXTEE File. The Constitutional Court, in a decision split six to six,
declined to hold the Judiciary Act unconstitutional in whole, but subsequently
interpreted the length of service requirement to be valid only for future members
of the Supreme Judicial Council. Id. See also Phillipa Fletcher, Bulgarian Court
'DeComunises" [sic] New Judicial Law, Reuters News Service - CIS and Eastern
Europe, Sept. 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, World News Library, TXTEE File.
188. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 186, n.13.
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of an American Constitutional Court? Seemingly, the Article III
"cases and controversies" requirement would bar such a court from
hearing abstract or speculative cases.189 The Supreme Court has
also traditionally refused to give advisory opinions to the political
branches of govemment.'9
Not all of the framers of our Constitution insisted on strict
structural demarcation. In The Federalist No. 66, Alexander
Hamilton wrote that the Separation of Powers doctrine is not
absolute, but "entirely compatible with a partial intermixture of
those departments for special purposes, while preserving them, in
the main, distinct and unconnected.
19'
James Madison had examined a "Council of Revision" as
part of the Virginia Constitution in 1788. The counsel would have
allowed judges and the executive to review acts of the state
legislature, under which members of either branch could object to
bills they deemed hasty, unjust, or unconstitutional. This would
necessitate reexamination of the proposed law with two-thirds or
three-fourths vote required for repassage. Madison suggested that
if there were constitutional objections and the legislature overrode
the council, the legislature would suspend the bill until the next
election, when it could repass it with a similar margin. 2
Edmund Randolph proposed a similar council of revision
consisting of the President and the Justices of the Supreme Court.
The council would have been authorized to examine bills passed by
Congress and reject them, "unless the Act of the National
189. U.S. CONST. art. Im, §. 2, ci. 1.
190. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Laurence H. Tribe,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 73 (2d ed. 1988).
191. THE FEDERALIST No. 66, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton) (Brittanica Great
Books ed. 1952).
192. Louis Fisher, The Curious Belief in Judicial Supremacy, 25 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 85, 90 (1991).
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Legislature be again passed.', 193 This would effectively permit an
advisory panel to suspend application of the law and allow the
legislature to give a statute a second look.
"But policy arguments supporting even useful 'political
inventions' are subject to the demands of the Constitution which
defines powers and ... sets out just how those powers are to be
exercised."1 94  There is no explicit mandate for an American
Constitutional Court. Arguably, unless there is a due process right
to be governed by law that is current and relevant,195 even the
proposals for a common law treatment of statutes proposed by
Calabrsi t96 would run afoul of the doctrine of non-delegation set
forth by the Supreme Court in LN.S. v. Chadha.1 97  A law
revision panel that is not firmly rooted in the legislative branch
would be unlikely to pass constitutional muster 98 necessitating
a formal constitutional amendment. 99
VI. CONCLUSION
We are indeed living in a time where we are "choking on
193. Id
194. I.N.S v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945 (1982).
195. Laurence Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 269
(1975).
196. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 82. See text at supra note 45.
197. 462 U.S. 919,945. "Explicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution
prescribe and define the respective functions of the Congress and of the
Executive in the legislative process." Id.
198. See 2 U.S.C. § 285b (1993) (authorizing the House Office of the Law
Revision Counsel ).
199. U.S. CONST. art. V.
19951
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statutes.''200 The problem of obsolete common laws that caused
Pound and Cardozo to call for the creation of a Ministry of Justice
has been supplanted by the problem of ambiguous and dated
legislation identified by Friendly and Ginsburg. While there has
been success in the creation of state law revision commissions 2° l
there is no true federal analogue.2°2 Calabresi's solution of a
common law approach to obsolete statutes faces the same problems
of finality and intercircuit conflict that are present in the current
judicial atmosphere.2 3
An American Constitutional Court, structured along the
lines of the Bulgarian model, could be an ideal arbiter of the legal
landscape. It should be impartial, apolitical, and not prone to
institutional inertia like an administrative agency. If American
scholars, legislators, and jurists come to recognize the need for a
systematic treatment of problematic statutes, an American
Constitutional Court, established pursuant to the Article V
amendment process, has the potential to be an effective solution.
At a minimum, the debate surrounding the proposed constitutional
amendment would be, in the words of Guido Calabresi, a "choice
for candor."2°4
200. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 1.
201. See list of jurisdictions, supra note 81.
202. The Office of Law Revision Counsel, despite its mandate 2 U.S.C. § 285b,
provides essentially a technical role in relation to the U.S. Code.
203. Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 996.
204. CALABRESI, supra note 1, tit 177.
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